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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues current international legal norms and constructs 
do not adequately address what constitutes casus belli in the cyber 
domain. Consequently, an initiating state may unintentionally invite a 
responsive use of force through cyber actions it considers far short of 
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the triggering threshold. Within the current ambiguity, however, the 
target state might consider those actions as well beyond that 
threshold. Such divergent viewpoints may result in open warfare 
between the two states. After applying emerging international 
analytical legal norms in two illustrative case studies, this paper 
recommends the United States adopt certain practices to reduce this 
dangerous ambiguity. These practices include more open 
acknowledgement of cyber actions and maintaining a clear separation 
between a state’s cyber attack/defense and espionage functions. They 
also include asserting sovereign control over certain portions of the 
cyber domain, vigorously protecting those areas, and increasing the 
reporting of incidents. 
Of course, you realize, this means war! 
  –Bugs Bunny1 
When the long-eared hero of animation utters the above-borrowed2 
phrase or a similar one,3 it is always in response to a provocation 
whose magnitude leaves no doubt concerning the appropriateness of a 
forceful response. The statement is declaratory and final. It invites no 
argument, because no argument is possible. The invariably clear casus 
belli—“an occurrence giving rise to or justifying war”4—by the 
offending character provides the required justification for the ensuing 
retaliatory mayhem. 
This is entertaining and lighthearted in the imaginary context of 
cartoons, where no amount of force is ever permanently harmful or 
lethal. However, the requirement to identify adequately acts justifying 
a state’s responsive use of force is a very real one with potentially 
lethal consequences. In stark contrast to the bright hues of cartoons, 
though, this analysis often occurs in a gray zone of uncertainty. 
 
1 BULLY FOR BUGS (Warner Bros. 1953). 
2 DUCK SOUP (Paramount Pictures 1933), available at http://movieclips.com/5xZ2y      
-duck-soup-movie-this-means-war/ (last visited June 9, 2013) (using the declarative, “This 
means war!” twice in the scene). 
3 WET HARE (Warner Bros. 1962), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=KvVyfgiN3ow (last visited June 9, 2013) (proclaiming, “Of course you know, this means 
war!”); see also A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1935), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvh1PdNJ2-8 (last visited June 9, 2013) (making the 
same declaration). 
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (9th ed. 2009). 
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Nowhere is this uncertainty more prevalent than in the newest war 
fighting domain5 of cyberspace.6 
This paper argues current international legal norms and constructs 
do not adequately address what constitutes casus belli in the cyber 
domain. Consequently, an initiating state may unintentionally invite a 
responsive use of force through cyber actions it considers far short of 
the triggering threshold. Within the current ambiguity, however, the 
target state might consider those actions as well beyond that 
threshold. Such divergent viewpoints may result in open warfare 
between the two states. 
This paper recommends the United States adopt certain practices to 
reduce this dangerous ambiguity. These practices include more open 
acknowledgement of cyber actions and maintaining a clear separation 
between a state’s cyber attack/defense and espionage functions. They 
also include asserting sovereign control over certain portions of the 
cyber domain, vigorously protecting those areas, and increasing the 
reporting of cyber incidents. 
The paper begins with an examination of the current norms 
concerning the use of force between states. It then details the 
emerging views concerning the application of these norms to the 
cyber domain. The paper goes on to apply these norms to the facts 
surrounding recently alleged state-level actions in the cyber domain. 
Based upon the conclusions drawn, the paper then presents 
recommendations for the United States  to help remove some of the 
uncertainty surrounding assessments of cyber operations under 
international law. 
 
5 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN 
CYBERSPACE 5 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf 
(“Though the networks and systems that make up cyberspace are man-made, often 
privately owned, and primarily civilian in use, treating cyberspace as a domain is a critical 
organizing concept for DoD’s national security missions. This allows DoD to organize, 
train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support 
national security interests.”). 
6 STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30735, CYBERWARFARE 1 (2001) 
(“Cyberspace is often used as a metaphor for describing the non-physical terrain created 
by computer systems. . . . Like physical space, cyberspace contains objects (files, mail 
messages, graphics, etc.) and different modes of transportation and delivery. Unlike real 
space, though, exploring cyberspace does not require any physical movement other than 
pressing keys on a keyboard or moving a mouse.”). 
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I 
USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Since its adoption in 1945, the Charter of the United Nations 
(U.N.) has served as the aspirational framework for relations between 
states. That it has often failed to restrain the conduct of certain states 
does not make considering, in the words of Michael Walzer, “the 
precise meaning of the Charter . . . a kind of utopian quibbling.”7 To 
the contrary, its provisions and those of other customary international 
law, such as the Hague8 and Geneva9 conventions, have a very real 
effect. As Nye and Welch put it, “[S]uch rules put a burden of proof 
on those who break them.”10 
Indeed, the very reason for attempting to clarify casus belli in 
cyberspace is to provide a clear standard against which states may 
measure their own behavior and that of other states when initiating or 
responding to cyber actions. While states may use force to act on their 
interests in ways contrary to defined international norms, they do so at 
a cost to their legitimacy and prestige.11 They also run the risk of 
drawing the collective ire of the international community, which may 
opt for group action to punish or to restore the status quo ante to 
ensure the offending state does not profit from its rule breaking.12 
 
7 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xviii (3d ed. 2000). 
8 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277. 
9 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 267. 
10 JOSEPH NYE & DAVID WELCH, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CONFLICT AND 
COOPERATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND HISTORY 25 (2011) (“Law and 
norms did not stop Saddam from invading Kuwait, but they did make it more difficult for 
him to recruit support, and they contributed to the creation of the coalition that expelled 
him from Kuwait.”). 
11 HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 80–81 (1985) (“Whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its 
prestige—its reputation for power—is always an important and sometimes a decisive 
factor in determining success or failure of its foreign policy. . . . Two factors make that 
triumph [of prestige] possible: reputation for unchallengeable power and reputation for 
self-restraint in using it.”) (emphasis added). 
12 See Thomas L. Friedman, The Iraqi Invasion; Bush, Hinting Force, Declares Iraqi 
Assault ‘Will Not Stand’; Proxy in Kuwait Issues Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/06/world/iraqi-invasion-bush-hinting-force  
2013] This Means War! (Maybe?)—Clarifying Casus Belli 417 
in Cyberspace 
Consequently, the first order question is, “What are the baseline 
rules?” 
In Article 2, the U.N. Charter clearly removes the use of force from 
the repertoire of legitimate state actions in the normal course of 
international relations. It requires U.N. members to “refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”13 
Recognizing, however, noncompliance by some states is possible (if 
not inevitable), the Charter details two currently relevant14 
circumstances when a responsive use of force is acceptable. 
The first circumstance occurs when the U.N. Security Council 
determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression”15 and authorizes under Article 42 “such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”16 Authorization for this type 
of action occurs only after careful deliberation. This mechanism is ill 
suited to match the speed at which cyber attacks can occur and at 
which an effective response must sometimes occur.17 Of greater 
relevance to the cyber domain than this deliberative process is the 
Charter provision allowing acts in self-defense. 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter permits “individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member.”18 In his 
volume, Striking First, Doyle characterizes this as “[t]he first and 
clearest case of just war. . . The country that is attacked and others 
 
-declares-iraqi-assault-will-not-stand-proxy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (quoting 
President Bush, “‘I view very seriously our determination to reverse this aggression. There 
are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I’ve just said. We will be 
working with them all for collective action,’ the President added. ‘This will not stand. This 
will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.’”). 
13 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
14 Id. art. 53, 107 (referencing in an obsolete manner an “enemy state” of World War 
II). 
15 Id. art. 39. 
16 Id. art. 42. 
17 Chris Strohm, Questions Unanswered in Pentagon Cyber Strategy, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL DAILY A.M., July 14, 2011, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 877037297 
(quoting Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, “Lynn also acknowledged the woes of 
dealing with such high-paced threats. ‘It’s difficult because there’s no real sovereignty in 
the Internet. It crosses borders. The effects of the actions on the Internet can take place in a 
matter of microseconds so there’s no time to have a deputies meeting and decide how to 
react,’ he added.”). 
18 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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may join in the defensive war in order to repel, and perhaps also to 
punish, an unjust attacker.”19 This response need not await Security 
Council authorization, though states must apprise the Security 
Council of the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. The 
Council may then take “such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”20 
Springing from this right of self-defense is the very narrow 
category of pre-emptive attack. In the words of Walzer, it is a “right 
recognized . . . in the legalist paradigm for international society.” It 
holds “states can rightfully defend themselves against violence that is 
imminent but not actual; they can fire the first shots if they know 
themselves about to be attacked.”21 A commonly cited example of the 
application of this norm is Israel’s attack to open the Six-Day War in 
1967.22 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the requirements for 
an acceptable preemptive attack during an exchange of letters with 
British authorities concerning the Caroline Case of 1837.23 Secretary 
Webster asserted the requirement “to show a necessity of self-defence 
[sic], instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.” Additionally, the preempting attacker must 
do “nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the 
necessity of self-defence [sic], must be limited by that necessity, and 
kept clearly within it.”24 The British agreed with Webster’s assertions 
and they have become customary international law. 
 
19 MICHAEL DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT xiii (2008). 
20 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
21 WALZER, supra note 7, at 74. 
22 See also DOYLE, supra note 19 at xiv (describing Israel’s attack as “[a] classic 
example of justified preemptive war—at least in the judgment of many commentators”); 
but see JOE BARNES & RICHARD STOLL, PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR: A 
PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY 13 (Mar. 2007), available at http://bakerinstitute.org 
/publications/Preemptive%20and%20Preventive%20War-1.pdf (arguing “the Israeli 
attacks of June 5 fall short of a strict definition of preemptive war” and “[t]hus, the Six-
Day War contains elements of both preemption and prevention”). 
23 See generally Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-
Defence in Contemporary International Law, 1 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 104, 104–20, 
available at http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/~wwwdrint/20042rouillard1.htm#_ftn1 (providing 
a detailed background of the case). 
24 See generally THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY, AND 
DIPLOMACY, BRITISH-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: THE CAROLINE CASE (2008), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (providing the full text of the 
exchange of letters between Secretary Webster and Lord Ashburton of Great Britain). 
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In his work, Walzer questions whether the right to anticipatory 
self-defense articulated in the Caroline rules “has any substance at 
all.”25 As he puts it, the right allows one “to do little more than 
respond to an attack once we had seen it coming but before we felt its 
impact. Pre-emption on this view is like a reflex action, a throwing up 
of one’s arms at the very last minute.”26 Walzer does not see this as a 
useful right because “[t]here is often plenty of time for deliberation” 
which makes ‘Webster’s reflex’ unnecessary.27 
To be fair, Walzer is not specifically addressing cyber actions in 
his analysis. However, whatever the relative merits of “Webster’s 
reflex” are in the conventional war fighting domains, it appears 
exceptionally appropriate in the cyber domain. In fact, Webster’s 175-
year-old formulation provides succinct, well established, and 
recognized international law authority for the concept of active 
defense discussed later. 
II 
GENERAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO 
CYBERSPACE 
Having laid out the most relevant customary norms justifying a 
state’s resort to force, it is appropriate to examine the general 
applicability of these norms to the cyber domain. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated the self-defense provisions of Article 
51 of the Charter, as well as Security Council enforcement measures 
under Article 42, “apply to any use of force, regardless of the 
weapons employed.”28 On its face, this brings cyber actions within the 
scope of the Charter. 
Additionally, it is U.S. policy to apply existing international norms 
in cyberspace. The White House’s International Strategy for 
Cyberspace states, “[C]yberspace does not require a reinvention of 
customary international law, nor does it render existing international 
norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state 
 
25 WALZER, supra note 7, at 74. 
26 Id. at 74–75. 
27 Id. at 75. 
28 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 39 (July 8). 
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behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in 
cyberspace.”29 
While the overall applicability of these norms is certainly not in 
doubt from a U.S. perspective,30 how to apply them is much less 
settled. It is far from obvious how the standards of the Caroline case 
and the U.N. Charter, formulated before the widespread use of 
electricity and electronics, respectively, factually apply to acts in the 
cyber domain. In the words of one author, “In fact, the entire field of 
international cyber law is still murky.”31 This uncertainty provides the 
very concerning risk of miscalculation this paper seeks to address. 
III 
THE TALLINN MANUAL AND CYBER WARFARE 
A substantial first step towards lifting some of this fog occurred in 
March 2013 with the publication of the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare [hereinafter the 
Tallinn Manual].32 The Tallinn Manual represents an attempt by a 
group of nineteen international experts “to produce a non-binding 
document applying existing law to cyber warfare.”33 The experts 
involved adopted the rules of the Tallinn Manual by “employing the 
principle of consensus.”34 While the authors admit “any claim that 
 
29 BARACK OBAMA, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 9 (2011), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for 
_cyberspace.pdf (“The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not 
require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing 
international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding state behavior—
in times of peace and conflict—also apply in cyberspace.”). 
30 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the U.S. 
Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 
18, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm (stating, 
“Question 1: Do established principles of international law apply to cyberspace? Answer 
1: Yes, international law principles do apply in cyberspace. Everyone here knows how 
cyberspace opens up a host of novel and extremely difficult legal issues. But on this key 
question, this answer has been apparent, at least as far as the U.S. Government has been 
concerned. Significantly, this view has not necessarily been universal in the international 
community. At least one country has questioned whether existing bodies of international 
law apply to the cutting edge issues presented by the internet. Some have also said that 
existing international law is not up to the task, and that we need entirely new treaties to 
impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace. But the United States has made clear our view 
that established principles of international law do apply in cyberspace.”). 
31 JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 31 (2010). 
32 MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (2013) [hereinafter THE TALLINN MANUAL]. 
33 Id. at 16. 
34 Id. at 19. 
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every assertion in the Tallinn Manual represents an incontrovertible 
restatement of international law would be an exaggeration,”35 it 
carries sufficient persuasive force to warrant its use. 
Indeed, given the accepted methods of determining international 
law on a particular subject, the Tallinn Manual may be the only 
available cyber warfare source for the near future. Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] details 
the generally accepted sources of international law. These include 
international conventions, international custom, general principles of 
law, as well as the subsidiary means of “judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations.”36 
Applying these sources to cyber warfare, one quickly exhausts the 
list. There currently are no applicable international conventions or 
treaties.37 Cyber warfare is a relatively new state capacity and 
customs emerge slowly (over decades, not years). General principles 
of law may be timeless, but they still require expert application. There 
are not yet any international judicial decisions on the topic. This 
leaves only the subsidiary means of highly qualified publicists as a 
currently available source. Consequently, the Rules and Commentary 
of the Tallinn Manual may be the best available lens through which to 
view the application of current international norms to the cyber 
domain. 
As an initial matter, it is important to understand the general nature 
of the international legal environment. The Lotus case provides a 
succinct statement of the two overarching behavioral norms with 
which states comply. One is permissive, while the other is restrictive. 
First, “under international law everything which is not prohibited is 
permitted.” Second, “[F]ailing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary[, a state] may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another.”38 The U.N. Charter harkens to these norms in its 
regulation of hostilities between states. 
 
35 Id. 
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
37 Lawrence J. Muir, Jr., The Case Against an International Cyber Warfare Convention, 
2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 5, 5 (2011) http://wakeforestlawreview.com/the-case-
against-an-international-cyber-warfare-convention. (“Over the past five years, a number of 
academic articles have called for the creation of an international convention to govern the 
rules, rights, and responsibilities of nations in cyber warfare and information operations.”) 
38 The Case of the S.S. Lotus, Judgment (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 
21 and 11 (Sept. 7), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927 
.09.07_lotus.htm (The first norm appears as a paraphrase in the dissent of M. Loder. The  
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As previously stated, Article 2 prohibits the “threat or use of 
force,” removing those acts from the spectrum of unregulated state 
behavior. However, absent some other prohibition, actions below the 
use of force threshold are permissible under international law. The 
self-defense clause of Article 51 is a permissive rule suspending the 
previous prohibition in response to an “armed attack.” Consequently, 
“use of force” describes what a state must refrain from doing until an 
“armed attack” occurs. Defining these two terms for the cyber domain 
is essential for avoiding state miscalculations. 
In its Rule 11, the Tallinn Manual defines a cyber operation as “a 
use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber 
operations rising to the level of a use of force.”39 On its face, this is 
not a very satisfying definition, as it uses the term “use of force” to 
define a cyber use of force. This would be less troubling if non-cyber 
“use of force” was well defined. Unfortunately, it is not. The Tallinn 
Manual acknowledges, “There is no authoritative definition of, or 
criteria for . . . ‘use of force.’”40 
Despite this shortcoming, the definition is not a nullity. It at least 
informs us the rules for the use of force in the cyber domain are no 
different from that of any other domain. Additionally, the term “scale 
and effects” carries some meaning. It appears in the ICJ’s decision in 
the Nicaragua case. In this case, the ICJ held an act done by a proxy 
might constitute an armed attack by the sending state if its “scale and 
effects” would classify it as an armed attack if done by a state’s 
regular armed forces.41 
It is important to note the ICJ was addressing “armed attack,” not 
“use of force.” The drafters of the Tallinn Manual forthrightly 
acknowledge their intentional expansion of the term’s application. 
They state, “[T]he Experts found the focus on scale and effects to be 
 
actual holding of the case states, “The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate 
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common 
aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”). 
39 THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 32, at 47. 
40 Id. 
41 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) [hereinafter The Nicaragua Case] (“The Court sees no reason to 
deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by 
a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its 
scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere 
frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.”).  
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an equally useful approach when distinguishing acts that qualify as 
uses of force from those that do not.”42 
This equality of approaches, however, does not make “armed 
attack” and “use of force” terms that possess a distinction without a 
difference.43 The ICJ makes this clear when it states, “[i]t will be 
necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force 
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.”44 
As Michael Schmitt so aptly puts it, “[i]n other words, whereas all 
armed attacks are uses of force, not all uses of force are armed 
attacks.”45 This is significant, as only an armed attack triggers the 
right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
The drafters of the Tallinn Manual were unanimous in their 
determination “some cyber operations may be sufficiently grave to 
warrant classifying them as an ‘armed attack.’”46 In defining “armed 
attack,” the Tallinn Manual again calls upon the “scale and effects” 
language. Rule 13 states, “Whether a cyber operation constitutes an 
armed attack depends upon its scale and effects.”47 
If one uses the same “scales and effects” analysis for determining 
both “use of force” and “armed attack,” it is worthwhile to define the 
threshold at which a use of force transitions into an armed attack. The 
Tallinn Manual characterizes this point as “unsettled” and “unclear.”48 
Unfortunately, the Tallinn Manual provides little additional clarity 
and may actually confuse this issue further. 
In discussing the armed attack threshold, the Tallinn Manual holds 
“some cases are clear.”49 The drafters “agreed that any use of force 
that injures or kills persons or damages or destroys property would 
satisfy the scale and effects requirement.”50 This seems to set a bright 
line rule. However, in the next comment, the Tallinn Manual removes 
this apparent clarity by stating, “[t]he law is unclear as to the precise 
point at which the extent of death, injury, damage, destruction, or 
 
42 THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 32, at 47. 
43 But see Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, 82 AM. SOC’Y 
OF INT’L L. PROC. 420, 422 (1988). 
44 The Nicaragua Case, supra note 41, at 101. 
45 Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn 
Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 13, 22 (2012). 
46 THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 32, at 54. 
47 Id. at 53. 
48 Id. at 55. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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suffering caused by a cyber operation fails to qualify as an armed 
attack.”51 It is difficult to discern how death, injury, damage, and 
destruction can both satisfy the scales and effects requirement and fail 
to qualify as an armed attack. 
Beyond this one instance of confusion, the Tallinn Manual’s 
inability to provide bright-line rules is understandable. After all, states 
have wrestled with the application of these terms to non-cyber 
activities for well over half a century and precise definitions are still 
elusive. Rather than fault the Tallinn Manual for failing to provide 
what may be impossible to provide, it is better to focus on what it 
does provide. It presents a compelling list of factors states “are likely 
to consider . . . when deciding whether to characterize any operation, 
including a cyber operation, as a use of force”52 and, by extension, a 
possible armed attack. 
IV 
FACTORS FOR ASSESSING USE OF FORCE IN CYBERSPACE 
The primary factors laid out by the Tallinn Manual are severity, 
immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military 
character, state involvement, and presumptive legality.53 This is 
admittedly a non-exhaustive list.54 Nonetheless, it provides a useful 
framework for analysis. A brief explanation of each primary factor is 
a necessary precursor for future application. It is helpful to categorize 
these factors under the headings of who, what, where, when, and how. 
Both state involvement and military character address the question 
of “who.” For state involvement, “[t]he clearer and closer a nexus 
between a State and cyber operations, the more likely” other states 
will see it as a use of force by the originating state.55 Military 
character raises the question of “whom” both in terms of the 
originator and the target. If either are military forces, it “heightens the 
likelihood of characterization as a use of force.”56 
The first aspect of the question of “what” is perhaps the most 
obvious. What actually happened because of the cyber operation? The 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 49 (drawing heavily upon the work of Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network 
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 914 (1999). 
53 Id. at 49–52. 
54 Id. at 52. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 51. 
2013] This Means War! (Maybe?)—Clarifying Casus Belli 425 
in Cyberspace 
concept of severity addresses this question and holds the distinction of 
being “[s]elf-evidently the most significant factor in the analysis.” 
Unless de minimis, any act “involving physical harm to individuals or 
property” will likely qualify as a use of force.57 The question of 
“what” is also applicable to an analysis of presumptive legality. What 
kind of operation was it? Recall that absent a prohibition, acts in the 
international realm are presumptively legal. This includes such 
negative actions as “propaganda, psychological operations, espionage, 
or mere economic pressure,” all of which are less likely rise to the 
level of a use of force.58 
The question of “where” seems to be a strange fit in a domain with 
no physical boundaries. However, it does matter where in cyberspace 
the attack occurs and where the physical effects occur. The concept of 
invasiveness covers this question. “As a rule, the more secure a 
targeted cyber system, the greater the concern as to its penetration.”59 
Operations against a highly classified military network are much 
more likely a use of force than those targeting commercial websites. 
Additionally, if the effects “are limited to a particular State,” it 
increases the perceived invasiveness of those operations.”60 If either 
of these conditions are true, it raises the likelihood a cyber action 
constitutes a use of force. 
The temporal question of “when” addresses the factor of 
immediacy. Immediacy holds that states are more likely to categorize 
“a cyber operation that produces immediate results as a use of force.” 
This is due to the decreased window of opportunity to “seek a 
peaceful accommodation” or prevent the “harmful effects.” Attacks 
that “take weeks or months to achieve their intended effects” are less 
likely in the use of force category.61 
While immediacy addresses the timing of causation, “directness 
examines the chain of causation.”62 This is a question of “how” the 
cyber operation causes the effect. The more directly linked the cause 
and effect, the more likely the cyber action is a use of force.63 The 
second aspect of the “how” question addresses measurability, as in 
“How bad was it?” It is easier “to characterize actions as a use of 
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force when the consequences are apparent.” Having “quantifiable and 
identifiable” consequences, such as “amount of data corrupted, 
percentage of servers disabled, number of confidential files 
extracted,” makes it more likely the operation will appear to be a use 
of force.64 
V 
APPLYING THE FACTORS 
Having laid out the assessment factors proposed by the Tallinn 
Manual, it is illuminating to test their utility by applying them to 
actual cyber events. This paper uses two case studies. The first is the 
2007 wave of cyber attacks aimed at Estonia, and the second is the 
Stuxnet malware attack in Iran made public in 2010. 
A. Estonia—The Cyberwar That Wasn’t 
On 27 April 2007, a wave of distributed denial of service attacks65 
hit various websites in Estonia. Affected sites included those of “the 
president, parliament, ministries, political parties, major news outlets, 
and Estonia’s two dominant banks.”66 The apparent precipitation of 
the attacks was the “decision to move a Soviet-era war memorial.”67 
Some attacked sites were “defaced to redirect users to images of 
Soviet soldiers.”68 The attacks occurred during a time of protest riots 
 
64 Id. at 51. 
65 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Understanding Denial-of-Service 
Attacks (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html (defining a denial-
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prevent legitimate users from accessing information or services. . . . The most common 
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information. . . . The server can only process a certain number of requests at once, so if an 
attacker overloads the server with requests, it can’t process your request. This is a ‘denial 
of service’ because you can’t access that site. . . . In a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attack, an attacker may use your computer to attack another computer. By taking 
advantage of security vulnerabilities or weaknesses, an attacker could take control of your 
computer. He or she could then force your computer to send huge amounts of data to a 
website or send spam to particular email addresses. The attack is ‘distributed’ because the 
attacker is using multiple computers, including yours, to launch the denial-of-service 
attack.”). 
66 Johnny Ryan, “iWar”: A New Threat, Its Convenience–and Our Increasing 
Vulnerability,” NATO REV., Winter 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007 /issue4 
/English/analysis2.html. 
67 War in the Fifth Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of 
Conflict? THE ECONOMIST July 1, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. 
68 Patrick Jackson, The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2007, 
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by ethnic Russian Estonians.69 The attacks continued for over a month 
and, at times, included up to 100,000 networked machines 
bombarding the targeted sites.70 
The Estonian response was to circle the wagons to fend off the 
attacks by closing down external server access, while attempting to 
continue to allow access by Estonian users. The head of information 
technology at the Estonian defense ministry stated the country was 
very dependent upon the internet due to the country’s “paperless 
government” and web-based banking. In his words, “If these services 
are made slower, we of course lose economically.”71 
At the time, Estonia believed the Russian government was behind 
the attacks,72 partially because the list of alleged offenders includes 
internet addresses “in the Russian government and presidential 
administration.”73 A Kremlin spokesman characterized the allegations 
as “completely untrue”74 and stated an internet address “does not 
mean foreign governments are behind these attacks. Moreover, as you 
probably know, IP addresses can be fake.”75 
Concurrently, one Russian internet pioneer indicated there was “no 
reason to believe in Russian state involvement” beyond that of 
“Russian state propaganda” fueling “anti-Estonian sentiments.”76 A 
member of “a pro-Kremlin youth group” stated “he personally took 
part in cyber-attacks . . . [although] he denied that Moscow state 
offices were used.”77 Eventually, a 20-year-old ethnic Russian 
Estonian student was the first convicted and fined for participation in 
the attack. Prosecutors claimed the attack was an act of protest.78 
One commentator characterized this incident as “more a cyber-riot 
than a war.”79 The below application of the Tallinn Manual’s 
assessment factors supports this view. Very few of the factors, if any, 
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RADIO LIBERTY, May 8, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347550.html. 
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weigh in favor of considering this incident a use of force, much less 
an armed attack. 
Applying the questions of “who” to this case illustrates what one 
commentator has deemed the “single greatest challenge to the 
application of the law of armed conflict to cyber activity”80—that of 
attribution. As the Kremlin spokesman pointed out above, even the 
use of government originating addresses does not necessarily mean 
state involvement. Despite initial concerns, the eventual conviction in 
this case indicates state involvement was not a factor. Likewise, the 
attack also lacked a military character. There was no specific targeting 
of Estonian military capabilities, nor was there any indication of 
Russian military involvement in the attacks. 
Answers to the questions of “what” also weigh against considering 
this a use of force. Despite the massive inconvenience, the attacks do 
not appear to have caused any physical harm or damage. The attacks 
lacked the severity necessary to cross the threshold of a use of force.  
Additionally, while the eventual conviction clearly indicates a 
violation of Estonian domestic law occurred, it is unclear the attacks 
violated any international legal norms. Even if Russia’s spread of 
propaganda fueled the attacks, such spreading of propaganda is a 
presumptively legal act in the international context. 
The question of “where” harkens to the invasiveness of the attack. 
While it is true the attacks were largely limited to Estonian sites, 
indicating a state-defined target set, they did not appear to target 
classified or secure networks. Even the government sites attacked 
were informational sites generally open to the public. No specialized 
access was necessary to reach these networks. Doors that are open to 
the public carry the risk of admitting unhappy members of that public. 
The effects of the attack also lacked the immediacy that would 
support characterizing the attack as a use of force. Examining the 
question of “when” makes it apparent Estonia had time to react and 
mitigate the effects of the attacks. During the month-long duration of 
the attacks, Estonia had time to lodge protests and take the protective 
measure of closing its sites to requests originating outside of Estonia. 
The use of force analysis for the attacks also fails on the question 
of “how.” Although Estonia perhaps did “lose economically,” the 
attacks lacked directness. The attacks did not actually destroy 
financial records or economic capacity. Instead, they simply made 
 
80 Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use of Force in Cyberspace: The Application of 
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regular financial transactions more difficult. It is also difficult to 
assign a monetary figure to this loss of convenience. This causes the 
attacks also to fail in the measurability analysis. 
The above analysis of the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia using the 
factors proposed by the Tallinn Manual indicate any characterization 
of these attacks as cyber “warfare” is overblown. The attacks and 
their effects fail in nearly every instance to demonstrate the proposed 
characteristics of a use of force. Interestingly, however, the primary 
author of the Tallinn Manual’s factors appears to reach a different 
conclusion. In his analysis, “[t]aken together as a single ‘cyber 
operation,’ the incident arguably reached the use-of-force 
threshold.”81 
This difference of opinion does not invalidate the analytic 
approach, but it does highlight the subjective and often uncertain 
nature of its outcome. In many cases, reasonable people may reach 
differing conclusions. The 2010 Stuxnet malware attack in Iran, 
however, is a much clearer case. 
B. Iran—A Likely Cyberwar Salvo 
In late 2009 or early 2010, Iran replaced approximately 1,000 of 
the centrifuges at its primary nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz, 
“implying that these centrifuges broke.”82 About that same time, 
however, a sophisticated piece of computer malware appeared “loose 
on the Internet”83 and drew the attention of computer security experts. 
They christened the malware “Stuxnet.”84 In November of 2010, 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad confirmed the cause of Iran’s 
centrifuge problems was some type of cyber attack. In his words, 
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someone “succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our 
centrifuges with the software they had installed in electronic parts.”85 
The Symantec computer security company characterizes Stuxnet as 
“a large, complex piece of malware . . . primarily written to target an 
industrial control system [ICS] or set of similar systems.”86 It does so 
by modifying the ICS’s “programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to 
make them work in a manner the attacker intended and to hide those 
changes from the operator of the equipment.”87 The malware is very 
precise in its targeting. 
Stuxnet “covertly changes the frequencies of certain types of 
frequency converters, which control the speed of motors.” Its 
intended targets are components associated with Iran’s centrifuges.88 
Stuxnet ultimately causes the centrifuges to rotate out of their 
designed tolerances. Such rotations “could destroy large numbers of 
centrifuges.”89 As early as 2008, the malware was apparently active at 
Natanz and causing centrifuges to spin “at faster-than-normal speeds 
until sensitive components began to warp and break.”90 A third 
version of Stuxnet, implemented shortly after the outside detection of 
the malware, caused the destruction of the 1,000 centrifuges.91 
The computer security community did eventually determine the 
software’s functioning and specific targeting of Iranian enrichment 
processes.92 However, it “came to no conclusions about who was 
responsible,”93 even after Symantec reported the location of two 
“command and control servers” in Malaysia and Denmark.94 
Symantec did note, however, “Stuxnet is of such great complexity—
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requiring significant resources to develop—that few attackers will be 
capable of producing a similar threat . . . .”95 
Although no government has openly acknowledged responsibility, 
subsequent news reporting based upon “leaks” in the U.S. 
government provides a possibility. According to news reports, the 
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) developed the malware with 
the help of Israel as part of a classified effort code-named Olympic 
Games.96 The operation “was geared toward damaging Iran’s nuclear 
capability gradually while sowing confusion among Iranian scientists 
about the cause of mishaps at a nuclear plant.”97 The U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israelis handled the problem of getting 
the software into the system. Because the plant’s equipment was not 
attached to the internet, emplacing the software “depended on spies 
and unwitting accomplices” to connect an infected device to the 
system.98 
The spread of the malware outside the Natanz system may have 
been the result of a coding error. However, as a testament to the 
targeting specificity of the malware, there was no damage resulting 
from the more than 100,000 computers unintentionally infected 
outside the plant.99 The effects inside the Natanz facility, however, 
were significant. As one reporter noted, “Stuxnet appears to be the 
first time the United States has repeatedly used cyberweapons to 
cripple another country’s infrastructure, achieving, with computer 
code, what until then could be accomplished only by bombing a 
country or sending in agents to plant explosives.”100 
Based upon the above facts, one cyber-expert opined, “Effectively 
the United States has gone to war with Iran and has chosen to do so in 
this manner because the effects can justify this means.”101 Could Iran 
consider this effort by the United States and Israel to be an armed 
attack justifying the use of force in self-defense? An application of 
the assessment factors proposed by the Tallinn Manual indicates such 
a conclusion is not only possible, but almost a certainty. 
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Both the state involvement and military character aspects of the 
question of “who” in this case point towards the legitimacy of 
considering this an armed attack. Poor U.S. security in leaking the 
potential identity of the malware’s originator may have solved the 
technical attribution problem. The importance of this cannot be 
overstated. Given the primacy of state action under international law, 
one frequent expert commentator was certainly correct when he 
noted, “the identity of the attacker may well determine if a state of 
war exists.”102 If other states assume the accuracy of public news 
stories not disavowed by the governments concerned, the creation and 
insertion of the malware were acts of state involvement by the United 
States and Israel. 
The “who” issue of the military character of the attack is a slightly 
closer question. The U.S. agencies allegedly involved were the NSA 
and CIA. These are not technically military organizations. However, 
the CIA does sometimes go beyond strict espionage by taking a more 
direct role in hostilities. For example, a CIA-led military operation 
was largely responsible for the destruction of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.103 Given this, it is likely other nations would consider 
the CIA at least a paramilitary arm of the United States. 
The target was also of a quasi-military character. Iran claims its 
uranium enrichment efforts are for peaceful purposes. However, the 
international community believes its true aim to be military—the 
development of nuclear weapons. A weapons-development program 
is more military than civil in nature. While it is not an unequivocal 
determination, the facts of this case weigh in favor of answering “yes” 
to whether the attack’s origin and target possess a military character. 
The answers to the questions of “what” are clearer determinations. 
When examining severity, acts causing physical harm cross the 
threshold as a use of force. Physical harm includes harm to property. 
The destruction of the centrifuges to necessitate their replacement 
meets this requirement. The attack also fails to qualify as an act of 
presumptive legality. Had the “spies and unwitting accomplices” only 
inserted information-gathering tools, this would have been an act of 
simple espionage presumed legal under international law. However, 
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the aim was to produce destructive results akin to bombing or 
planting explosives. This nullifies any presumptive legality argument. 
Turning to the question of “where,” it is clear the attack was highly 
invasive. Given its nature, the Natanz facility is likely one of Iran’s 
most secure facilities. The lack of connectivity between its systems 
and the internet supports this assessment. Additionally, the malware 
was highly engineered to target only specific components at this 
specific plant. Even when it unintentionally spread outside the plant, 
it had no real effects. The highly secure nature of the plant and the 
extreme specificity of the targeting both place the attack at the high 
end of the invasiveness scale. 
The aspect of immediacy associated with the question of “when” is 
more complex. The first version of the malware apparently ran for 
months without causing alarm. The program, as designed, obscured 
the nature of the centrifuge failures in an attempt to damage Iran’s 
capability gradually. This approach lacked immediacy. 
Despite this lack of immediacy, however, the malware eventually 
gained outside notice. Perhaps fearful the Iranians would piece things 
together and close the window of opportunity, the attackers 
introduced a newer variant that caused the abrupt destruction of 1,000 
centrifuges. This newer variant possessed the immediacy the original 
version lacked. Its entire purpose was to cause its effects before the 
Iranians could react to mitigate the harm. 
Turning to the final question of “how,” the attack appears to have 
both the requisite characteristics of directness and measurability. It is 
clear the malware’s manipulation of the frequency controllers 
initiated the short chain of causation that led to the centrifuge failures. 
The 1,000 simultaneous failures are otherwise difficult to explain. 
Those same 1,000 failures are a distinctly measureable result one can 
attribute to the attack. 
Given the above analysis, the consideration by “many experts” of 
Stuxnet as “the first cyber weapon in history” appears valid.104 To call 
it a “State sponsored attack” aimed at “the critical infrastructures of a 
foreign country with the specific intent to destroy them” 105 is not an 
exaggeration. The operation possesses all of the characteristics 
suggested by the Tallinn Manual as indicators of a use of force, if not 
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an armed attack, under international law. Although Iran cannot 
currently speak from a position of moral authority regarding 
international norms, it would appear justified in raising a complaint 
regarding this incident. 
VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASING CYBERSPACE CLARITY 
The two above case studies fall in at the opposing ends of the 
spectrum of analysis using the assessment factors proposed by the 
Tallinn Manual. The cyber attack on Estonia arguably possesses 
practically none of the characteristics of a use of force, while the 
attack on Iran demonstrates nearly all of them. It is fair to surmise 
future incidents will likely fall somewhere between these two 
extremes. 
Applying a balancing test will be necessary in instances where 
some factors support the characterization of a use of force, while 
others mitigate against it. There is always a level of ambiguity 
associated with such analysis. Because the outcome of the analysis 
may provide justification under international law to go to war, it is in 
the interest of states to remove as much ambiguity as possible. The 
United States can lead this effort by taking a number of actions, both 
in the offensive and defensive contexts. 
A. On the Offense 
First, in the offense, the United States should demonstrate 
“secrecy” and “cyber” are not synonymous when it comes to state 
involvement. The United States does not have a history of launching 
surprise attacks and has an aversion to doing so. It was Robert 
Kennedy’s likening a surprise invasion of Cuba to Pearl Harbor that 
“discredit[ed] the hawks” and enabled the “more prudent approach” 
of a naval quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis.106 In this same 
vein, a non-attributable “cyber sneak attack” with widespread effects 
against another state appears distinctly un-American. 
However, the United States may enjoy a significant technological 
advantage in the cyber domain that it has every right to exploit. The 
United States may choose to use cyber methods in self-defense or as 
an offensive use of force during already ongoing hostilities. When it 
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does so, it should not attempt to mask the origin of these cyber actions 
and should take responsibility for them. 
All U.S. weapons, including cyber weapons, undergo two legal 
reviews. As an initial matter, an examination ensures the weapon is 
not per se contrary to international legal norms before it even enters 
the U.S. weapons inventory.107 Afterwards, any significant 
employment of the system undergoes another review to determine 
whether the intended use also complies with international law.108 This 
prevents the use of otherwise legal weapons in illegal ways. 
Cyber weapons undergo this same legal analysis.109 If they pass, 
there is no reason to mask their use. The United States should be as 
hesitant to do so as it would be to send its regular forces into combat 
lacking the “fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance”110 
embodied in their uniforms. Failure to take ownership of cyber 
attacks risks the target state responding too broadly and drawing 
others into the conflict. Additionally, if there is a question of the 
appropriateness of a cyber action, acknowledgement of that action 
allows target states recourse to international bodies that settle such 
disputes. This allows the building of a body of law and state practice 
that clarifies what is appropriate. 
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This recommendation holds well for openly conducted conflicts. 
The Iran attack demonstrates, however, that states sometimes 
determine their interests require surreptitious actions. It would be 
Pollyannaish to assume this never happens or that one can prevent it 
from happening. In such cases, state involvement is still a significant 
issue. Should the non-attribution fail, the target state may have a 
legitimate recourse to open warfare. The gravity of this outcome 
makes the protection of that anonymity highly important. 
Consequently, the United States should actively investigate and 
prosecute “leaks” of the type that revealed the Olympic Games 
operation to the world. The release of such highly classified 
information is a crime and the potential for harm is enormous. 
Second, in the offense, the United States should take care not to 
overly militarize its cyber capabilities. Doing so may inadvertently 
give a military character to actions that would otherwise enjoy 
presumptive legality as espionage. For example, a single U.S. General 
heads both the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the 
NSA. The organizations are even co-located. According to U.S. 
policy, this allows “these separate and distinct organizations . . . to 
maximize talent and capabilities, leverage respective authorities, and 
operate more effectively to achieve DoD’s mission.”111 The 
separateness and distinctness of these organizations matters. 
USCYBERCOM, “when directed, conducts full-spectrum military 
cyberspace operations . . . in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom 
of action in cyberspace, while denying the same to our adversaries”112 
As part of its Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission, the NSA, 
“collects, processes, and disseminates intelligence information from 
foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and 
to support military operations.”113 These missions carry an important 
distinction. 
Target states will view any cyber attack or defense action under 
USCYBERCOM authority as having a clear military character. 
However, NSA’s SIGINT mission falls squarely into a category most 
would consider traditional espionage. This categorization is important 
given the customary international norm that information-gathering 
espionage efforts do not amount to a use of force. 
 
111 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 5–6. 
112 U.S. CYBER COMMAND FACT SHEET, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, available at 
http://www.strat com.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/ (last visited June 10, 2013). 
113 ABOUT NSA, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about 
/mission/index.shtml (last visited June 10, 2013). 
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It is no doubt organizationally beneficial that USCYBERCOM “is 
charged with pulling together existing cyberspace resources.”114 
However, the United States should take care not to blur functional 
lines too greatly. By doing so, it may inadvertently forfeit the useful 
protection of presumptive legality its cyber espionage efforts 
currently enjoy. 
For example, consider the insertion of surreptitious information-
gathering software into a sensitive foreign military system. Most 
would immediately characterize such an action by the NSA as simple 
espionage, and not necessarily a prelude to further escalation. These 
are extremely useful actions the United States can routinely undertake 
without risking recourse to war. This is true even when the 
information gathered may be of tremendous military value. However, 
it may give the recipient state greater concern to learn the perpetrator 
was the military’s USCYBERCOM. This raises the question of 
whether the intrusion is part of a larger, perhaps more imminent, 
military effort. 
The more closely these organizations align, the more difficult it is 
for states to draw this distinction. Should the distinction disappear in 
the reasoning of other states, the United States may have to self-limit 
its espionage for fear of others viewing it as an escalatory military 
action. This would result in a case where increased organizational 
efficiency actually led to decreased operational effectiveness. 
B. On the Defense 
The above recommendations pertain primarily to U.S. actions on 
the offensive end of the spectrum. The United States can also lessen 
ambiguities on the defensive end. Clear declarations concerning 
invasiveness can put opposing states on notice concerning what 
incursions the United States will treat as possible armed attacks. 
One author calls cyberspace “the latest domain of commerce and 
globalization to emerge as a global common.”115 However, the entire 
globe is not a commons. States exercise recognized territorial 
sovereignty over portions of the land, air, and sea domains. There is 
no reason cyberspace must be treated as outer space, without any 
 
114 U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, supra note 112. 
115 Steven H. McPherson & Glenn Zimmerman, Cyberspace Control, in SECURING 
FREEDOM IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS 83, 83 (Scott Jasper ed., 2010). 
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assertions of territorial sovereignty.116 Human beings create the 
networks and nodes that comprise the cyber domain. States 
sometimes go to great lengths to maintain separation between certain 
sensitive networks and nodes and the “open” cyber commons. When 
they do so, states should enjoy the equivalent of sovereign rights over 
that portion of the cyber domain. 
This is more than just an academic concept. With sovereignty 
comes a recognized right of exclusion and defense. There is no 
expectation that a state stand idly by while thousands or millions of 
unknowns make unwanted and uninvited attempts to cross it borders 
in the air, land, or sea domains. Attempts in these numbers occur 
daily in the cyber domain.117 In traditional domains, states might view 
the vast majority of cases as criminal acts appropriate for handling by 
immigration authorities. However, some attempts might occasionally 
fit the profile of an invasion, which would trigger the inherent right to 
self-defense. The analysis need not differ much for the cyber domain. 
As a first defensive step, the United States should declare its most 
critical cyber networks and nodes as under its sovereign protection 
and state its intention to exclude all others, just as it would from its 
physical territory. It has already done so, in effect, by its declaration 
that it does “reserve the right to defend these vital national assets as 
necessary and appropriate.”118 Basing this right upon sovereignty is a 
logical step into an already-existing legal framework. 
This acquisition of sovereignty by assertion is not without parallel 
in the land domain. “Acquisition of land traditionally was, and still 
remains, dependent on power processes, often backed by military 
strength . . . [T]he rules for allocating title to a particular state are 
heavily dependent on a showing of physical control.”119 In other 
words, the power to keep others away eventually becomes a 
recognized right to keep them away. 
 
116 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. II, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347 (“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.”). 
117 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 3 (stating, “DoD networks are probed millions 
of times every day, and successful penetrations have led to the loss of thousands of files 
from U.S. networks and those of U.S. allies and industry partners”). 
118 Id. at 10. 
119 Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search 
of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 705–06 (2001). 
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As a second defensive step, the United States should employ active 
cyber defenses in those portions of the cyber domain over which it 
claims sovereignty. Active defenses involve detecting, tracing, and 
performing some type of cyber counter-attack against the intruder.120 
This can occur in an automated mode at network speed, typically after 
the intruder bypasses passive defenses. 
It is here that “Webster’s reflex” detailed in the Caroline rules has 
remarkable applicability for the 21st century.121 After breaching 
passive defenses, damage may occur faster than humans can react, 
making an electronic reflexive action necessary to prevent harm. The 
U.S. Department of Defense has already declared it “will employ an 
active cyber defense capability to prevent intrusions onto DoD 
networks and systems.”122 Such measures should defend all critical 
systems, whether DoD or otherwise. 
Finally, the United States should commit to reporting instances in 
which its active defenses actually deploy. This is consistent with its 
obligation under the U.N Charter to inform the Security Council of 
measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defense in response 
to an armed attack.123 Because an active defense mechanism typically 
has a destructive component, it is likely a use of force. Only an armed 
attack justifies a use of force in response. 
Laying out the circumstances of the use of force (though certainly 
not its technical means) and the perception of the armed attack that 
precipitated it provides two benefits. First, it helps deters future 
attacks, as effective deterrence requires a certain level of knowledge 
and common understanding about the possible response. Drawing on 
the work of Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence,124 one 
commentator refers to this as having “a shared idiom of action” in 
which “countries interpret military actions and reprisals similarly.”125 
This “shared understanding of limits, norms, and expected responses 
 
120 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self Defense and 
Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J. L.AW & TECH. 415, 419 (2012). 
121 Matthew J. Sklerov, Responding to International Cyber Attacks as Acts of War, in 
INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 45, 45–75, (Jeffrey Carr ed., 2010) (providing a detailed analysis 
of the specific application of international law to active defenses). 
122 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 5, at 6. 
123 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
124 THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (2008). 
125 Vincent Manzo, Deterrence and Escalation in Cross Domain Operations: Where 
Do Space and Cyberspace Fit?, 66 JOINT FORCES Q. 8, 10 (3d Quarter, 2012). 
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creates a necessary frame of reference by which actors distinguish 
between proportionate and escalatory behavior.”126 
Second, it also helps to lessen quickly the ambiguity currently 
surrounding the application of international law to the cyber domain. 
It is difficult to clarify this legal regime when there is no 
acknowledgement or discussion of current state practice. Open 
information allows legal commentators, practitioners, and judicial 
authorities to build a body of accepted international law. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, this paper first detailed the international legal 
norms currently governing the use of force between states. The key 
components of the regime are the overall prohibition against the use 
of force and the exception for force used in self-defense, to include 
anticipatory self-defense, against an armed attack. It then examined 
the factors proposed by the Tallinn Manual as indicators a cyber 
action qualifies as a use of force. These factors included state 
involvement and military character (who), severity and presumptive 
legality (what), invasiveness (where), immediacy (when), and 
directness and measurability of effects (how). 
Applying these factors to the 2007 cyber attack against Estonia 
indicated the attacks did not qualify as a use of force or armed attack. 
The application to the 2010 Stuxnet attack against Iran reached the 
opposite finding. That particular cyber action likely did qualify as an 
armed attack under the proposed Tallinn Manual analysis. 
Recognizing a vast grey area exists between these two extremes, the 
paper recommended several steps the United States could take to 
reduce dangerous ambiguities and lessen the risk of state 
miscalculation. 
First, the United States should take responsibility for its clearly 
justified offensive uses of force in the cyber domain. As a corollary, it 
should vigorously seek to prosecute those who compromise its 
anonymity in special cases where national interests preclude such 
open acknowledgement. Second, to protect the presumptive legality 
of cyber espionage, the United States should not blur the distinction 
between it and cyber attack/defense by allowing functions to 
intermingle too closely between organizations. Third, the United 
States should draw a bright line as to its invasiveness tolerance by 
asserting sovereignty over some portions of the cyber domain. Fourth, 
 
126 Id. at 11. 
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the use of active defenses is the most effective means of asserting and 
protecting these U.S. sovereignty claims. Fifth and finally, U.S. 
reporting of active defense deployments will help customary 
international legal norms develop more quickly. 
The cyber domain is a relatively new environment. As with all 
such environments, a certain amount of discovery learning must take 
place. However, it is in everyone’s interest to reduce the ambiguities 
in the domain as quickly as possible to ensure no one blunders into 
war. It is towards this aim that this paper directs the above 
recommendations. One hopes the phrase, “Of course, you realize, this 
means war!” will never be necessary between states. However, if it 
ever is, it would unspeakably tragic if the alleged offending state 
could legitimately disagree. 
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